SECURITIES-INSIDER

TRADING-IN PARi DELICTO DEFENSE IN-

APPLICABLE IN RULE

lOb-5 ACTIONs-Bateman Eichler, Hill

Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 105 S. Ct. 2622 (1985).
The law concerning insider trading' under the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 has recently given rise to much controversy.
The viability of the in pan delicto 4 defense in relation to insider
trading is one issue that has arisen under section 10(b) of the
Act. 5 In particular, disputes focus on the use of the defense to
bar recovery by plaintiffs because of their own unlawful conduct.6
I "Insider trading" is defined as the trading of stock by a corporation's officers,
directors, and larger than 10% shareholders. Manne, Insider Trading and the Administrative Process, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 473, 474 (1967). An "insider" is defined as
including officers, directors, and controlling shareholders as well as "those persons
who are in a special relationship with a company and privy to its internal affairs." In
re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
2 Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78kk
(1982)).
3 See, e.g., Crane, An Analysis of Causation Under Rule lOb-5, 9 SEC. REG. L.J. 99
(1981) (court's failure to address issue of causation as it relates to rule lOb-5); Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CALIF. L.
REV. 80 (1981) (imposition of secondary liability on defendants who had not themselves expressly violated statute); Note, Omission and Nondisclosure Under SEC Rule
10b-5: A Distinctionin Search of a Diference, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 423 (1979) (defining
omission and nondisclosure in relation to rule lOb-5 violations).
4

In pari delicto is defined as "in equal fault."
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ed. 1979). The common law defense is derived from the Latin in pari delicto potior est
conditio defendentis which means "in a case of equal or mutual fault . . . the position
of the defending party. . . is the better one." Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc.
v. Berner, 105 S. Ct. 2622, 2626 (1985). The defense is based on two premises;
first, courts should not mediate among wrongdoers and second, that illegality is
deterred by prohibiting an acknowledged wrongdoer from obtaining judicial relief.
Id. at 2626-27.
5 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). Section 10(b) states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails,
or of any facility of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
Id.
6 See, e.g., Berner v. Lazzaro, 730 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 105 S. Ct. 2622 (1985) (defense not
permitted); Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 965 (1977) (defense permitted); Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700 (5th
Cir. 1969) (defense permitted); Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F.
Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (defense not permitted).
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In modern years, the lower federal courts that have wrestled with
the issue have reached divergent results.7 The United States
Supreme Court had not addressed the question until its recent
decision in Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner.s In that
case, the Court determined that the defense was not available to
a securities professional disclosing inside information. 9
The factual setting in Bateman Eichler concerned Charles Lazzaro, a registered securities broker,"° employed by the brokerage
firm of Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. (Bateman Eichler)."I
While in the employ of Bateman Eichler, Lazzaro allegedly released false inside information to several investors in an effort to
manipulate the price of T.O.N.M. Oil and Gas Exploration Corporation (TONM) stock.' 9 In addition, TONM's president, Leslie Neadeau, allegedly conspired with Lazzaro in the perpetration
of the fraud. 3
In 1979, TONM, along with its subsidiary, International
Gold and Diamond Exploration Corporation, Inc., entered into a
series of joint venture mining agreements with six Surinamese
4
companies pursuant to licenses granted to these companies.'
Beginning in November of 1979, Lazzaro induced investors to
purchase TONM stock by informing them that he was privy to
certain material, nonpublic information received from TONM's
president.' 5 Lazzaro told the investors that TONM acquired options for land upon which large amounts of gold had been dis7 See, e.g., supra n.6.

8 105 S. Ct. 2622 (1985).
9 Id. at 2633.
10 A registered securities broker is someone who is registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission to act as a broker or dealer under the provisions of 15
U.S.C. § 78(a). See 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1982) (registration requirements of broker or
dealer).
I I Bateman Eichler, 105 S. Ct. at 2624.
12 Id. The facts relied upon in the case are those set forth in the respondent's
complaint. Id. Since the district court dismissed the action based on Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the complaint was construed in the respondent's favor
and their allegations assumed to be true. Brief for the Securities and Exchange
Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 2 n.2, Bateman Eichler,
105 S. Ct. 2622 (1985) (No. 84-679) [hereinafter SEC Brief].
13 Bateman Eichler, 105 S. Ct. at 2624.
14 Joint Appendix at 8, Bateman Eichler, 105 S. Ct. 2622 (1985) (No. 84-679)
[hereinafter Joint Appendix]. The term of the leases which were granted to the
companies by the Surinam government was three years. Id. Surinam is a country of
approximately 363,000 people. NEWSPAPER ENTERPRISE ASSOCIATION, INC., THE
WORLD ALMANAC & BOOK OF FACTS 582 (1985). The country is located on the
north Atlantic coast of South America and was formerly known as Dutch Guiana. Id.
5 Berner v. Lazzaro, 730 F.2d 1319, 1320 (9th Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 105 S. Ct. 2622 (1985).
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covered, that the discovery was not yet publicly known, and that
it would soon be revealed.' 6 Lazzaro also informed the investors
of a proposed joint venture for the mining of the gold for which
TONM was currently in negotiations.' 7 As a result of these ventures, Lazzaro told the investors that when this information became public knowledge, the price of TONM stock would go up
10 to 15 points.' 8 Lazzaro also represented that the stock, which
was currently selling between $1.50 and $3 per share, might rise
in value to as much as $100 per share within one year's time. 19
In an effort to confirm Lazzaro's representations regarding
his friendship with Neadeau, as well as his revelations about
TONM's dealings, some of the investors contacted Neadeau. °
Neadeau, however, would neither confirm nor deny Lazzaro's
representations. 2 ' Neadeau's reasoning for not responding was
that the information was not yet public knowledge.2 2 Neadeau
did say, however, that Lazzaro was very trustworthy and that he
was a good man.2 3
The investors purchased TONM stock based on the premise
that they,
24 through Lazzaro, were privy to certain nonpublic infor-

mation. ~There was, however, no subsequent announcement of
22

the joint venture by TONM as Lazzaro promised.2 5 Initially after
the purchases, the price of TONM stock rose to $7 per share.2 6
Ultimately, however, the price of the stock fell below $1 per share
in early 1981.27
16 Bateman

17 Id.

Eichler, 105 S. Ct. at 2624.

18 Id.
19 Id. Lazzaro also informed the investors that all of TONM's shareholders
would receive additional shares of stock of International Gold and Diamond Exploration (I.G.D.E.) for each share of TONM stock they owned without having to pay
any extra money for it. Id. at 2624 n.3.
20 Id. at 2624.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Joint Appendix, supra note 14, at 12. Lazzaro attributed there being no announcement to a lack of certain required SEC filings by TONM, the death of the
wife of one of the company's executives, and delays in cementing the joint venture.
Id. at 12-13.
26 Bateman Eichler, 105 S. Ct. at 2625 n.4. Some of the investors told Lazzaro
that they wanted to sell their TONM stock at that time. Id. Lazzaro, however, informed them that he would tell them when to sell and that they should not sell yet
because the price would go even higher. Id.
27 Id. at 2624-25. When the joint venture fell through in early 1981, the stock
price fell. Id. In addition to the price of the stock falling, Lazzaro's prediction as to
the issuance of additional I.G.D.E. stock for each share of TONM owned never
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The investors filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California against Lazzaro, Neadeau,
TONM, and Bateman Eichler.2 8 The plaintiffs alleged that they
suffered substantial losses as a result of the scheme to manipulate
the price of TONM's stock.2 9 The investors claimed that the
scheme violated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,30 as well as Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
rule l0b-5.3 ' The court dismissed the claims on the basis that the
materialized. Joint Appendix, supra note 14, at 12. In March of 1980, I.G.D.E. issued rights to purchase shares of I.G.D.E. common stock to TONM stockholders at
a cost of $1.50 per share. Id. The rights were issued at a rate of one right for every
five shares of TONM common stock owned. Id. TONM shareholders were never
given the right to receive I.G.D.E. stock without payment. Id.
28 Bateman Eichler, 105 S. Ct. at 2624. Bateman Eichler's liability was based on
§ 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. at 2624 n.l. That section confers joint and several liability on "[elvery person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or
regulation thereunder .... ." 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1982).
29 Bateman Eichler, 105 S. Ct. at 2625.
30 See supra note 5 for text of section 10(b).
31 Bateman Eichler, 105 S. Ct. at 2625. Rule lOb-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails
or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1985).
The appropriate scope of rule lOb-5 as it relates to insider trading has been
much discussed in recent years. Questions have arisen in view of the failure of the
statutory language explicitly to consider fraud involving tippers, tippees, and securities professionals which may fall under section 10. See Note, CorporateOutsider AMay
Be Liable for Failure to Disclose or Abstain Under Rule lOb-5 Based on Employer-Employee
Fiduciary Relationship, 13 SETON HALL L. REV. 178, 182 (1982). The statutory language of rule I Ob-5 places no importance on the relationship between the corporation, the violator of the statute, and those with whom they deal. Id. These statutory
gaps were left to be filled by the courts. Id.
The case law involving rule lOb-5 and insider trading began to develop with
the seminal case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). In that case,
the SEC held that a securities professional was under an obligation to disclose material nonpublic information or abstain from trading on it when he received inside information about a dividend from a director of the issuer. Id. at 912 (emphasis
added). The SEC focused on:
first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly,
to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose
and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent
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plaintiffs were in pai delicto 32 with the defendants, since, by knowingly purchasing stock on insider information, they too had violated the statutory provision under which they sought recovery. 3
Thus, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were absolutely
4
3
barred from recovery.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court. 5 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that
the investors were in violation of the federal securities laws. 3 6
On the facts presented, however, the court discerned less than
equal culpability among the parties.37 Specifically, the court held
that a tippee/investor was not as blameworthy in a securities
fraud action as an insider or broker. 38 Thus, the court concluded
unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.
Id. This disclose-or-abstain rule was intended to prevent a corporate insider from
profiting on information which was known to be unavailable to other parties. Id.
The Cady, Roberts disclose-or-abstain rule was later adopted by the Second Circuit in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub
nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). In that case, the court expanded the
disclose-or-abstain rule. Id. at 851-53. The rule announced by the Texas Gulf
Sulphur court encompassed anyone who possessed material nonpublic information
and required that they either disclose the information or abstain from trading on it
while it remained nonpublic. Id. (emphasis added).
In subsequent years, the disclose-or-abstain rule was applied to situations involving the tipper-tippee relationship. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); In re Investors Management Co.,
Inc., 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971). This application of the rule is based on a belief that
tippees have a duty not to profit from information that they know is confidential
and know or should know came from a corporate insider. Shapiro, 495 F.2d at 23738. The tippee's obligation arises from his role as a participant after the fact in the
insider's breach of his fiduciary duty. Id. Shapiro also determined that the proper
class of investors who could recover in these types of actions were those individuals
who purchased securities between the time of the defendant's trading on the inside
information and the time of disclosure. Id. at 241. But see Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980) (measure of damages in tipper liability case
limited to tippee's profits).
See also infra notes 107-23 and accompanying text (discussing recent developments of duty to disclose).
32 See supra note 4 for the definition of in pan delicto.
33 Bateman Eichler, 105 S. Ct. at 2625.
34 Id.
35 Berner v. Lazzaro, 730 F.2d 1319, 1324 (9th Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 105 S. Ct. 2622 (1985).
3 6 Id. at 1322.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 1324. Relying on prior law, the Ninth Circuit found that in private antitrust suits, the in pari delicto defense does not apply if the facts show less than equal
fault on the part of the plaintiff. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts
Corp., 392 U.S. 132 (1968);Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 546 F.2d 276 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977). It was the Ninth Circuit's opinion that the
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that "the defense of in pan delicto is inappropriate as a sole basis
for dismissal of a complaint in a private action under the federal
securities laws, unless the alleged facts show that the investor is
equally responsible for his injury." 9 On appeal, the Supreme
40
Court unanimously affirmed the Ninth Circuit.
Although the literal translation of in pan delicto 4 is equal
fault, the doctrine historically has been applied in a wide assortment of situations where the party seeking equitable relief or
damages has himself been involved to some degree in the same
kind of wrongdoing. 42 The defense of in pan delicto was created at
common law 4 in order to assure that wrongdoers would not benefit from their transgressions.4 4 Under the doctrine, a party is
precluded from recovering damages if the losses suffered are
caused substantially by action that is prohibited by law. 4 5 Accordingly, a court will give aid to neither party and will allow the
same rule should apply to private actions brought under federal securities laws.
Berner, 730 F.2d at 1321-22. The court believed that this approach would be most
consistent with the full and fair disclosure requirements of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and its purposes of protecting investors. Id. at 1322 (citing U.S. v.
Carman, 577 F.2d 556, 564 (9th Cir. 1978)). In the Ninth Circuit's view, this rule
was determinative of the issue presented since, as the court noted, the Supreme
Court had stated that a judicial sanction prohibiting a private suit by a plaintiff will
not be allowed when that sanction would hinder the clear legislative intent of a
statute. Id. Thus, the court believed that allowing Bateman Eichler to successfully
raise the in pari delicto defense would hinder the intent of section 10 of the Act. Id.
In addition to being consistent with the intent of the securities laws to prohibit
fraud by brokers and dealers, the court reaffirmed the principle that private suits by
investors are a necessary supplement to SEC enforcement. Id. at 1323. Further,
according to the Ninth Circuit, private actions also serve as a deterrence to fraud by
exposing potential miscreants to the threat of private liability. Id.
The court noted that this is true even in cases in which the investor is not
completely innocent himself. Id. The court opined that the availability of the defense would result in many 1Ob-5 violations remaining unexposed due to the elimination of any incentive to sue on the part of the defrauded investor. Id. Therefore,
the Ninth Circuit held that the in pari delicto defense was inappropriate. Id. at 1324.
39 Id.
40 Bateman Eichler, 105 S.Ct. at 2633.
41 See supra note 4 for a definition of in pari delicto. A correlative principle to in
pan delicto is the equitable doctrine of "unclean hands" which states that "he who
comes into equity must come with clean hands." MCCLINTOCK, PRINCIPLES OF EQurTY 59 (2d ed. 1948). The unclean hands defense, however, was inapplicable in
the Bateman Eichler case since only legal (monetary) damages were sought. See id.
42 See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138 (1968).
43 Historically, the purpose of the doctrine was to protect the court's integrity
where it was asked to choose between two wrongdoers. Nea, Limitations on Defenses
Under 10(b): In Pari Delicto and Unclean Hands, 5 U. RICH. L. REV. 251, 257 (1971).
44 See, e.g., Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152, 1156 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 965 (1977).
45 Id. at 1157.
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losses to remain as they are."6 There is, however, an important
public policy limitation to the foregoing rule. 7 Courts may allow
a party who is in pari delicto to sue for relief if the court determines that public policy will be advanced by allowing the party to
48
recover.
Although the Supreme Court never considered the applicability of the in pan delicto defense as a bar to private rights of action under the federal securities laws, 4 9 the Court had been
presented with that issue involving a private antitrust action
plaintiff in its 1968 decision in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.5 In Perma Life, the petitioners, former dealers
and operators of "Midas Muffler Shops," alleged that Midas restrained and substantially lessened competition through their
sales agreements with the dealers in violation of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts. 5 ' The petitioners, however, subscribed to the
agreements and profited despite the contested restrictions. 5 2 The
Court ruled that the defense was inapplicable in the instant case
because of the overriding public interest to be served.5" Writing
the opinion of the Court, Justice Black set forth the proposition
that the threat of treble damage suits acted as a strong deterrent
to antitrust violations.5 4 Justice Black also reaffirmed the Court's
unwillingness to invoke "broad common-law barriers to relief
46 See, e.g., 3J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 940-41 (5th
ed. 1941).
47 See id. § 941.
48 Id. A second limitation on the common law defense is that a court can only
look to the conduct related to the transaction before it. Id. The court may not
prohibit recovery based on a plaintiff's actions in a separate setting. See Tarasi v.
Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152, 1157 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965
(1977).
49 The first case to hold that there is an implied private right of action under rule
lOb-5 was Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). A
majority of the circuits now recognize the private right of action. See 3 L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 1763-64 (2d ed. 1961 & Supp. 1969). The Supreme Court
has also recognized the private right of action. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1983).
50 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
51 Id. at 135.
52 Id. at 138. Although the petitioners accepted the terms of the agreements as
presented, they repeatedly objected to the restraints as harmful to their welfare. Id.
at 139. The Supreme Court determined that this conduct eliminated any blameworthiness on the part of the petitioners since they did not actively promote the respondents' scheme. Id.
53

Id.

54

Id. at 139.
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where a private suit serves important public purposes."5 5 Accordingly, Justice Black believed that the doctrine of in pan delicto
should not be recognzied as a valid defense in antitrust actions.5 6
The approach of the lower federal courts that have considered the applicability of the defense in securities laws cases has
57
been either to distinguish Perma Life so as to allow the defense
or to use the holding as the basis for disallowing it.5 8 For exam55 Id. at 138. Justice Black suggested that, if the petitioners actively participated
in the illegal scheme, the defense may be allowed. Id. at 141.
56 Id. at 140. The Court felt no need to decide whether a plaintiff who was completely involved with and participated in the monopolistic scheme could be barred
from bringing an action. Id. The Court found that the dealers had relatively little
bargaining power in this case and that they had not acted voluntarily in their actions. Id. at 140-4 1.
In four separate opinions, five Justices agreed that in some narrowly defined
circumstances the plaintiff's own conduct could serve as a basis for defense in antitrust actions. In his concurrence, Justice White explained that the defense is inapplicable if the plaintiff is substantially equally responsible for his injury. Id. at 146
(White, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Justice Fortas agreed that the defense is
barred if responsibility for the injury is equal. Id. at 147 (Fortas, J., concurring).
Justice Marshall indicated that the defense would be allowable only if the private
antitrust defendant proved "that the plaintiff actively participated in the formation
"
and implementation of an illegal scheme, and is substantially equally at fault ..
Id. at 149 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justices Harlan and Stewart, who concurred in
part and dissented in part, disagreed with the majority's definition of in pari delicto.
Id. at 153 (Harlan & Stewart,JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justices
Harlan and Stewart would have remanded the case for a determination of whether
the plaintiffs voluntarily cooperated with the defendants to violate the law. Id.
57 For cases allowing the in pari delicto defense, see, e.g., Wolfson v. Baker, 623
F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981) (broker who failed to
advise investor that his holdings were large enough to require registration and that
sale of his holdings would be illegal could successfully use in pari delicto defense to
bar investor's recovery against him under securities laws); Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l
Bank, 555 F.2d 1152 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965 (1977) (rule 10b-5 claim by
investor against tipper who provided investor with false inside information barred
by in pari delicto defense); Malamphy v. Real-Tex Enter., Inc., 527 F.2d 978 (4th Cir.
1975) (in pari delicto used to deny recovery to experienced real estate brokers who
voluntarily entered into a scheme to defraud the general public); James v.
DuBreuil, 500 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1974) (Kuehnert rule of allowing in pari delicto defense applies to transactions effectuated in public market); Kuehnert v. Texstar
Corp., 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969) (defense applicable in rule lob-5 claim against
corporate insider who gave false tip to an investor who bought stock on open market); Grumet v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 336 (D.N.J. 1983)
(defense of in pari delicto could be used to bar recovery by investor against broker
where broker's inside information turned out to be false even though broker was
not true insider).
58 For cases disallowing the defense, see, e.g., Berner v. Lazzaro, 730 F.2d 1319
(9th Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 105 S.
Ct. 2622 (1985) (defense of in pari delicto inappropriate as basis for dismissal of
alleged lOb-5 violation where tippee is not of equal fault with broker-tipper); Mallis
v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1123 (1981)
(defense of in pari delicto not appropriate in rule lOb-5 tipper-tippee action when
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pie, in 1969, in Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp.,59 the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals was faced with the issue of deciding whether the in
pan delicto defense could serve to bar a duped tippee 6 1 from recovering against his tipper under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. 6 1
In that case, the president of Texstar Corporation, Rhame, told
his friend Kuehnert of a pending merger between Texstar and
Coronet Petroleum Company. 62 Rhame additionally told Kuehn' 63
ert of some secret discoveries on a highly favorable "farmout
by Texstar from which high dividends and an increase in stock
value were expected. 64 The "farmout" representations were not
accurate and, as a result, Kuehnert lost all of his investment.65
Both parties claimed rule lOb-5 violations. 66
In affirming the district court's summary judgment for the
defendant, the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff's own illegal
conduct barred his recovery.67 The court acknowledged that,
plaintiff's wrongdoing was not equal to defendant's and when plaintiff's alleged
wrongdoings were not sufficiently related to statutory violations or objectives
under rule 1Ob-5); Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283 (4th Cir. 1978) (defense disallowed when parties not mutually at fault and when regulatory objectives would be
interfered with if defense was allowed); Xaphes v. Shearson, Hayden, Stone, Inc.,
508 F. Supp. 882 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (defense does not apply to noninsider broker
because his customer not a tippee having duty to disclose); Moholt v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 451 (D.D.C. 1979) (in pari delicto not valid defense by
broker in quasi-fiduciary position relative to plaintiff-investor and who is not
equally at fault with his duped investor); Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc.,
325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (in pari delicto not available in rule 1Ob-5 claim by
investor against broker-insider who gave out false information).
59 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969).
60 A "tipper" is a person who has possession of "material inside information"
and who makes selective disclosure of such information for trading or other personal purposes. See, e.g.,
3 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD &
COMMODITIES FRAUD 190.7 (1985). The tipper must also have a duty not to disclose the information. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). A "tippee" is one who
receives such information from a "tipper". Id. "Materiality" is defined as whether
"there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider [an
omitted fact] important in deciding how to vote." TSC Indus. Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (emphasis added). See also infra notes 117- 23 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the duties required of tipper and tippee.
61 Kuehnert, 412 F.2d at 703.
62 Id. at 702.
63 "Farmout" is defined as "[t]o let for a term at a stated rental. To turn over
for performance or care. To exhaust farm land by continuous raising of a single
crop." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 546 (5th ed. 1979).
(4 Kuehnert, 412 F.2d at 702.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 701. Kuehnert sued Rhame alleging that he had violated rule lOb-5. Id.
Rhame, in turn, claimed that Kuehnert had violated rule lob-5 since he failed to
disclose the material, nonpublic information before he traded on it. Id. at 702.
67 Id. at 703.
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while certain areas of law give rise to exceptions to this general
rule,68 the guiding principle for application of the in pan delicto
defense is one of policy. 6 9 In the Fifth Circuit's view, the public

interest of accounting among joint conspirators was not sufficient
justification to bar the defense in securities actions.70 In a direct
response to the Supreme Court's holding in Perma Life, the
Kuehnert court felt that the public interest in private actions under
the federal securities laws was not comparable to the public interest of treble damage in antitrust actions. 7 The court further distinguished the instant case from Perma Life; in Kuehnert, the
plaintiff-tippee's actions were entirely voluntary and no form of
duress could be alleged, whereas the same could not be said in
Perma Life.72 In fact, Kuehnert was an active participant in the
73
wrongdoing.
In holding that Kuehnert's status as a tippee made the defense of in pan delicto available to Rhame, the Fifth Circuit articulated that the application of the defense lies with the discretion of
the court and is based upon policy.74 The court, in balancing the
potential harm to investors presented by the countervailing arguments, determined that the danger of allowing tippees to recover
was clearly superior. 75 The court agreed with Kuehnert that allowing the defense would leave little incentive for a tipper not to
intentionally release false information.76 Nevertheless, the court
reasoned that disallowance of the defense would in effect give the
tippee an enforceable warranty that the material, nonpublic in68 See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134
(1968) (in pari delicto defense does not apply in antitrust law).
69 Kuehnert, 412 F.2d at 703.
70 Id. at 703.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 703-04. See also supra note 52.
73 Kuehnert, 412 F.2d at 703-04.
74 Id. at 704. The court rejected Kuehnert's claim that he did not violate rule
1Ob-5. Id. Kuehnert's claim was based on the fact that the "inside information" he
traded on was false. Id. at 703-04. The court felt that "the statutory phrase 'any
manipulative or deceptive device' " in the 1934 Act was broad enough to include
conduct irrespective of its result. Id. at 704. Thus, the court felt that Kuehnert's
intent was important and the degree of success of his scheme was irrelevant. Id. at
704. The Bateman Eichler Court expressed no view on the plaintiff-investors' liability since it was not addressed below. Bateman Eichler, 105 S. Ct. at 2630 n.21. The
Court merely assumed that the respondents' activities rendered them at fault. Id.
75 Kuehnert, 412 F.2d at 705. According to the court, the question was "which
decision will have the better consequences in promoting the objective of the securities laws by increasing the protection to be afforded the investing public?" Id. at
704.
76 Id. at 705.
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formation he received was true.7 7 The court concluded its analysis by observing that allowing the defense in other antifraud
sections of the securities laws has not limited the effective enforcement of those provisions.78 Furthermore, the court noted
that tippees presented virtually the same threat to investors as
did insiders themselves and, as such, should be discouraged from
79
acting inappropriately.
Eight years later, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
in Tarasi v. PittsburghNat ' Bank8 0 also held that a private defendant in a 1Ob-5 action could successfully claim the defense of in
pan delicto. 8 ' In Tarasi, a group of disappointed investors brought
suit against their banker because they lost money after buying
stock on the basis of his inside information.8 2 The court distinguished the case at bar from the Supreme Court's decision in
Perma Life by noting that the plaintiffs' conduct here were voluntary.8 3 The court noted that the plaintiffs' conduct contributed
significantly to their losses and posed a great threat to the investing public.8 4 The court, however, also observed that Perma Life
left open the possible applicability of the defense if the plaintiff's
unlawful conduct was found to be active and significant.8 5 The
court agreed that denying the defense would deter tippers who
deliberately passed false information, but questioned its effect on
tippers who believed that their information was true.8 6 The court
questioned whether the threat of tippee suits would deter potential tippers because proof of scienter is a prerequisite to recovery
in a private lOb-5 action.8 7 In addition, because of the rarity of
tippee suits, the court concluded that the best solution would be
to rely on potential SEC penalities to deter tippers.8 8 The court
posited that the best way to deter tippees was by making the deId.
Id. The court cites as an example the area of proxy regulation. Id.
79 Id.
80 555 F.2d 1152 (3d Cir. 1977).
81 Id. at 1164.
82 Id. at 1154.
83 Id. at 1162.
84 Id. at 1163.
85 Id. at 1158.
86 Id. at 1163. The court's doubt presumably arose because the plaintiff would
have to demonstrate that the tipper knowingly gave out false inside information
concerning the transaction in question.
87 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). The Court defined "scienter" as the "mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."
Id. at 193 n.12.
88 Tarasi, 555 F.2d at 1164.
77
78
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fense of in pari delicto available to defendant-tippers.8 9
In 1971, the District Court for the Southern District of New
York faced the same issue as the Kuehnert and Tarasi courts in
Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc.9

The Nathanson court, how-

result. 9 '

In Nathanson, the plaintiffs
ever, reached the opposite
received material inside information concerning a merger from
representatives of the defendant.9 2 In reliance on this "tip," the
plaintiffs purchased stock.93 When the information proved false,
the plaintiffs lost rather than made money and brought suit
against the securities broker. 94 In his analysis, Judge Weinfeld reviewed the reasoning earlier courts used in determining whether
to permit the in pari delicto defense. 95 Judge Weinfeld determined
that the public policy considerations of protecting the investing
public and effective enforcement of the securities acts' antifraud
provisions were accomplished by discouraging insiders from releasing inside information to a preferred group.9 6 The Nathanson
court cited the Supreme Court's holding in Perma Life as indicative of the unavailability of the in pan delicto defense in securities
violations cases.97 The court observed that the underlying policies of private enforcement of the securities acts and the antitrust
89 Id. In 1983, the District Court of New Jersey was faced with the same issue as
the Tarasi court in Grumet v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 336
(D.N.J. 1983). The Grumet court held that the defense of in pari delicto was available
to a broker whose inside information proved to be false and caused substantial
losses to an investor although the broker may not truly have been an "insider"
within the meaning of the securities laws. Id. at 341. The Grumet court relied on
Tarasi and Kuehnert as the basis for its decision. Id. at 338-40.
90 325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
91 See id. at 53.
92 Id. at 51.
93 Id. Relying on the defendant's claim that one share of TST stock would be
exchanged for one share of Elgin stock in the merger, the plaintiffs purchased TST
stock. Id. When the merger was completed, the actual ratio of exchange was one
share of Elgin stock for every two and one-half shares of TST stock. Id. at 52.
94 Id. at 51-52.
95 Id. at 52. In particular, Judge Weinfeld examined the Kuehnert case which allowed the defense, and Wohl v. Blair & Co., 50 F.R.D. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), which
denied it. Id. at 52.
96 Nathanson, 325 F. Supp. at 53-54. The court reiterated the well-documented
opinion that the chief policy of Congress underlying the 1934 Act was "to prevent
inequitable and unfair practices and to insure fairness in securities transactions."
Id. at 53 (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)). The court also
noted that the actualization of "[riule lob-5 'is based in policy on the justifiable
expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors . . . have relatively equal
' " Id. at 53-54.
access to material information ....
97 Nathanson, 325 F.2d at 56.
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laws were quite similar. 98
It was the view of the Nathanson court that the insider
presented a potentially greater risk to the investing public than
the non-insider.9 9 The court concluded that an insider serves as
the nucleus of the confidential information, while a tippee may
have only innocently received the information and thereby
presents only a minimal potential for harm.'0 0 The court noted
that the most effective way of restricting the use of material inside information while it was unavailable to the investing public
was by making the defense of in pan delicto unavailable to the insider.'
In the court's view, denying the defense would serve as
an effective deterrent to selective disclosure of material inside
0 2
information.
In 1981, in Xaphes v. Shearson, Hayden, Stone, Inc.,103 the

Southern District of Florida was also asked to consider the applicability of the in pari delicto defense in a securities laws case.'0 4 In
Xaphes, the defendant broker induced the plaintiff to purchase
various stocks of companies that were allegedly subject to takeover bids. 10 5 This inside information proved false as no takeovers occurred thereby leaving the plaintiffs without their
anticipated profits.' 0 6 In its decision whether to permit the in pari
delicto defense, the Xaphes court considered the Supreme Court's
1980 decision in Chiarella v. United States 107 and its effect on the
98 Id. at 56 n.30.
99 Id. at 57.
100 Id. This interpretation is no longer valid in view of the decision in Dirks v.
SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), in which the Supreme Court held that a tippee is some-

one with a duty to disclose. See infra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
101 Nathanson, 325 F.2d at 57.
102 Id. at 57-58.

103 508 F. Supp. 882 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
104 See id. at 884.
105 Id. The defendant was a brokerage firm whose agent allegedly convinced the
plaintiff to start a margin account with them. Id. The plaintiff transferred his "blue
chip" stocks to the account. Id. Subsequently, the defendant's agent convinced the

plaintiff to sell some of these stocks and to buy others about which the agent
claimed to have inside information. Id. This claim proved to be false and the plaintiff lost money. Id.
106 Id.

107 445 U.S. 222 (1980). The law relating to insider trading under rule lOb-5 was
changed drastically by the Supreme Court in its decision in Chiarella v. United
States. See generally Note, The Availability of the In Pari Delicto Defense in Tippee-Tipper
Rule lOb-5 Actions After Dirks v. SEC, 62 WASH. U.L.Q 519, 535-36 (1984). (discussing impact of Chiarellaand Dirks on availability of in pari delicto defense). In Chiarella,

the Supreme Court reversed Vincent Chiarella's rule lOb-5 conviction. Chiarella,
445 U.S. at 236-37. Chiarella worked for a financial printer who was hired by corporations to print documents to be used for tender offers and other acquisitions.
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issue at hand. 0 8 In Chiarella, the Supreme Court held that rule
1Ob-5 liability was based on a duty to disclose nonpublic information, which duty arose from fiduciary relationships between the
parties.' 9' Mindful of this holding, the Xaphes court determined
that since Philip Xaphes did not breach the duty established in
Chiarellaas he was not a tippee, there could be no finding that his
actions constituted equivalent fault to that of the defendant."'

The court distinguished the facts in Xaphes from those of Kuehnert."
In Kuehnert, the defendant was a corporate insider who
12
gave out false information about the corporation's stock."

Therefore, the plaintiffs were actual tippees since they received
their information from insiders who had a duty to disclose." 3
Conversely, in Xaphes, the plaintiff was held not to be a tippee
because the nonpublic information was not disseminated by an
insider.'"' According to the Xaphes court, it is only when a plaintiff breaches some duty to disclose, thereby becoming a blameworthy party, that the defense of in pan delicto arises." 15
Furthermore, according to the Xaphes court, the public policy
considerations favored placing liability upon the defendant who
Id. at 224. The names of the target companies were not given to the printing company until immediately prior to the public announcement of the acquisition. Id.
Chiarella deciphered the names of the target companies from information contained in the material to be printed and bought shares in the target companies
based on this information. Id. He later sold the shares at a profit and was convicted
based on the law at the time which established liability for anyone who traded while
in the possession of material nonpublic information. Id. at 224-25. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and required that liability under
rule lob-5 be based on "a duty to disclose [material nonpublic information] arising
from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction." Id. at
230. The Court did not consider Chiarella's possible liability under a "misappropriation" theory since the theory was never submitted to the jury at trial. Id. at 23537. Misappropriation theory liability would have been based on Chiarella's breach
of duty to the acquiring corporation when he traded upon information obtained as
an employee of a financial printer retained by the corporation. Id. According to
the Court, the use of confidential information does not constitute fraud under section 10(b) when the person using the information is not a corporate insider and is
not acting in a position of trust and confidence toward the sellers of the securities.
Id. at 230-33. The Court felt that application of any other rule would create a general duty among "all participants in market transactions to forego actions based on
material, nonpublic information." Id. at 233.
108 Xaphes, 508 F. Supp. at 886.
109 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232-35.
11O Xaphes, 508 F. Supp. at 886.
'''
Id. at 885.
112 See supra notes 59-79 and accompanying text.
'13 Xaphes, 508 F. Supp. at 886.
114 Id. at 885.
115 Id. at 886.
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6

In 1983, in Dirks v. SEC, 1 7 although the Supreme Court did
not address the in pari delicto defense, the Court both reasserted
and clarified its Chiarella decision." 8 In Dirks, the Court reversed
the lower court's holding that a broker who released nonpublic
information though not trading on it was in violation of the securities laws." 9 The Court reaffirmed Chiarella and confirmed
that the duty to disclose material nonpublic information is based
on the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the parties to
a transaction. 20 In Dirks, the Supreme Court defined the parameters of the fiduciary relationship respecting tippees.12' In the
Court's view, a tippee has a duty to disclose material nonpublic
information or abstain from trading on it only when he knows or
should know that his insider has breached his fiduciary duty by
disclosing the information. 22 Thus,
the tippee's duty to disclose
123
is derived from the insider's duty.
It was against this backdrop of conflicting decisions and interpretations that the Supreme Court was presented with the
Bateman Eichler case. Justice Brennan, writing for a unanimous
Court, began the opinion in Bateman Eichler by giving a brief history of the common law defense of in pan delicto. 1 24 Citing the
Court's holding in Perma Life, Justice Brennan re-emphasized the
sentiment that it is inappropriate to use broad common law defenses as barriers to relief because a private action provides a valuable public service.' 25 The Court disagreed with the
defendants' argument that the principles espoused in Perma Life
supporting the unavailability of the in pai delicto defense were inapplicable in the case at bar.' 2 6 In particular, the Court noted
116

Id. at 886-87.

117 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
118 See id. at 657-58.

Id. at 652.
Id. at 654-55.
See id. at 659-64.
Id. at 660-61.
Id.
Bateman Eichler, 105 S. Ct. at 2626. See also supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
125 Bateman Eichler, 105 S. Ct. at 2627.
126 Id. at 2628. The basis of this contention by the defendants was that Perma Life
was an antitrust case and that Congress had expressly provided for private rights of
action under the antitrust laws. Id. Conversely, however, private rights of action
under securities laws were implied by the courts and not expressly provided for by
Congress. Id. As such, the defendants asserted that a broader application of the
defense of in pari delicto should be supported in securities actions. Id.
''9
120
121
122
123
124
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that there is nothing in the Perma Life decision which suggests
that it is only when Congress expressly provides for private remedies that public policy implications should dictate. 2 7 The Court,
therefore, opined that it could fairly apply the full force of its
holding in Perma Life to an implied private cause of action under
the securities laws. 12 8 Accordingly, the Court held that the plainby the in panr
tiff in private securities actions may only be barred
delicto defense when the plaintiff is at least "substantially equally
responsible" for the injury for which he seeks reparation, such
injury being a direct consequence of his own actions. 2 9 Furthermore, the Court concluded that preclusion of the defense would
advance the proficient execution of the securities laws."'
In analyzing the apportionment of fault among Bateman
Eichler, Lazzaro, and Neadeau, the Court disagreed with the defendants' contention that the plaintiffs' fault was substantially
equal to their own. The Court determined that since the plaintiffs had acted voluntarily' 3 ' in trading on the inside information,
they were culpable parties under rule lOb-5.13 2 The Court relied
on its holding in Dirks v. SEC 133 as the basis for rejecting this
contention.13 4 It was the opinion of the Court that a person
whose culpability is derived solely from another
party could not
5
be said to be as guilty as the other party.1
The Court also relied on Dirks to opine that an insider com13 6
mits a potentially wider range of violations than does a tippee.
127 Id. In addition, the historical application of the common law defense required
that public policy implications be considered in applying the doctrine. Id.
128 Id. at 2629.

129

Id.

Id.
This is a distinction lower courts have made. See, e.g., Tarasi v. Pittsburgh
Nat'l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152, 1161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965 (1977); Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1969).
132 Bateman Eichler, 105 S. Ct. at 2630. Rule lOb-5 was promulgated pursuant to
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See supra note 31 for text of
rule 1Ob-5. The Act was passed in an effort to protect "the investing public and the
national economy through the promotion of a 'high standard of business ethics...
in every facet of the securities industry.' " Bateman Eichler, 105 S. Ct. at 2631 (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186-87 (1968)).
133 463 U.S. 646 (1983). See also supra notes 117- 23 and accompanying text.
134 Bateman Eichler, 105 S. Ct. at 2630.
130
131

135

Id.

Id. This was based on a belief that a tippee who trades on inside information
is often guilty of fraud against the shareholders. Id. This is a violation for which
responsibility is shared by the tipper. Id. In addition, frequently the insider also
has breached his fiduciary duty toward the issuing company himself. Id. The tipper
who intentionally gives false material inside information to a tippee also has com136
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Due to the possible scope of the tipper's violations, the Court
reasoned that a tippee cannot properly be classified as someone
of substantially equal fault with a tipper, unless there is some
other action by the tippee which outweighs the insiders' violations. 1 7 According to the Bateman Eichler Court, the facts did
not support any claim of such action by the tippees. 3 8 The
Court determined that Lazzaro and Neadeau initiated the con3 9
duct which resulted in the rule lOb-5 violation by the plaintiffs.
This, according to the Court, made the defendants far more culpable than the plaintiffs. 140 Therefore, the Court concluded that
the plaintiffs' fault could not be considered equal to the
insiders'.1 4 1
The Court next dealt with the general effect of the in panr
42
delicto defense on the objectives of the federal securities laws.'
The Court began with the premise that barring private actions by
allowing the defense would result in many frauds going undetected by the SEC. 143 The Court opined that the defense of in
pan delicto would remove the incentive for defrauded investors to
bring private suits against the defrauding tipper and, as a result,
would take away one of the chief methods that the SEC has of
14 4
detecting such frauds.
The Court then discussed the policy ramifications of the in
pan delicto defense. 14 5 The Court concluded that it was more important in terms of deterrence for the insider- tipper, rather than
the tippee, to be discouraged from acting illegally. 146 According
mitted fraud against the tippee. Id. Such fraud is even more serious when the tipper is a securities broker who has a fiduciary duty toward his clients. Id.
137 Id. The Securities Industry Association, who submitted an amicus curiae brief,
contended that the defense of in pari delicto should bar recovery against a defendant
brokerage firm whose liability was based on its status as a "controlling person"
over the defrauding party. Id. at 2631 n.25. This claim was based on the fact that,
due to this status, the brokerage firm's liability was vicarious. Id. The Court expressed no opinion on this contention since neither the defendant nor the Ninth
Circuit had raised the issue previously. Id.
138

Id.

Id. In reviewing this case on appeal, the Supreme Court accepted the facts as
they were presented in the complaint as being true since the district court dismissed the case based on the pleadings. Id.
140 Id.
139

141
142

Id.
See id.

143 Id. This issue was raised by the SEC in its amicus brief. See SEC Brief, supra

note 12, at 25.
144 Bateman Eichler, 105 S. Ct. at 2631-32.
145 See id. at 2632.
146 Id.
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to the Court, the rationale behind this objective is that the insider
is the "fountainhead" of the inside information; if, therefore, the
insider is inhibited from releasing such information, a lOb-5 violation may be averted. 4 7 The Court also reasoned that an insider is more likely to have the benefit of counsel than the
investor and, as such, is more likely to know that his conduct is
wrong.148 As a result of these public policy factors, the Court
concluded that the defense of in pan delicto was inappropriate in
actions such as the one before it.' 4 9
In the final part of the opinion, Justice Brennan addressed
one of the key reasons emphasized by lower courts allowing the
1' 5 1
defense.

5 °

This was the so-called "enforceable warranty.'

Under this doctrine, if the tip received proves accurate, the tip152
pee acquires illegal profits and therefore has no reason to sue.
Conversely, if the tip proves incorrect, the tippee sues the tipper
for the money lost.' 5 3 The Court was not persuaded by the en-

forceable warranty theory for two reasons. 154 First, a tippee
55
would only be able to recover if the insider acted with scienter. 1
Therefore, according to the Court, only when a tippee has been
deliberately defrauded will he be able to recover. 56 Secondly,
the tippee would be subject to substantial civil and criminal penalties under the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984'17 and, as
such, would not be free of liability for his actions. 158 The Court
concluded that because the public interest was best protected by
denying the defense, in pan delicto did not bar the investors from
147 Id. (citing Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50, 57-58
(S.D.N.Y. 1971)).
148

Id.

149

Id.

15o See id.
at 2632-33.

Id.
Id.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 2633.
155 Id. See also supra note 87 for definition of scienter.
156 Bateman Eichler, 105 S. Ct. at 2633.
157 Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 1, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u(d)(2)(A). (Supp. 1985)). Under the Act, the amount of the civil penalty that
may be imposed is "determined by the court in light of the facts and circumstances" of each case. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(A). The penalty, however, may "not
exceed three times the profit gained or loss avoided as a result of such unlawful
purchase or sale" in violation of rule lOb-5. Id. The Act also provides for a criminal sanction of not more than $100,000. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (Supp. 1985). Prior to
passage of the Act, the maximum criminal penalty was $10,000. Id.
158 Bateman Eichler, 105 S.Ct. at 2633 n.32.
151

152

166
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recovering against the insiders in Bateman Eichler.159
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court applied the
correct standard of law by stating that the defense of in pan delicto
would only be allowed in cases in which the plaintiff is of substantially equal fault with the defendant.' 60 The Court, however,
erred in avoiding certain issues, as well as by its convoluted analysis of others. In appraising the Court's holding both in terms of
the case at bar and in terms of the broad implications it creates,
the decision is problematic at best.
The first difficulty created by the Court is in its express holding that the defense will only be allowed in cases in which the
plaintiff, by his own actions, "bears at least substantially equal
responsibility for the violations he seeks to redress."''
The
trouble created by this standard is that it is unclear. By deciding
to hear this case, the Court had before it the opportunity to elucidate what constitutes "substantial equal responsibility," and to
elaborate the factors to be considered in determining if equal
fault exists. Prior to the Court's decision in Bateman Eichler, it was
universally held that the standard to be used in cases of this kind
was "substantial equal responsibility."'' 6 2 The difficulty in those
cases, however, arose when courts were asked to determine if the
requisite fault existed on the part of the plaintiffs. 163 By failing to
set precise guidelines to answer this question, the Court's decision in Bateman Eichler is rendered virtually useless as authority in
all but identical factual settings.
At various points of its opinion, however, the Court appears
to be proffering a formula. For example, the Court, relying on
Dirks, stated that a tippee's duty is derivative from the tipper-insider.' 6 The Court maintained "that a person whose liability is
solely derivative can[not] be said to be as culpable as one whose
breach of duty gave rise to that liability in the first place."'' 6 5 It
appears from this statement that the Court is attempting to preclude the defense from ever being raised in the tipper-tippee
Id. at 2633.
Id. at 2630-31. See also Brief of Petitioner at 43, Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 105 S.Ct. 2622 (1985)(No. 84-679)[hereinafter Brief of Petitioner]; SEC Brief, supra note 12 at 16.
161 Bateman Eichler, 105 S. Ct. at 2629.
162 See, e.g., Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152, 1157 (3d Cir. 1977);
Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1969); Nathanson v. Weis,
Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
163 See, e.g., supra note 162.
164 Bateman Eichler, 105 S. Ct. at 2630.
165 Id.
159
160
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context since a tippee's duty is always derivative.1 6 6 This is inconsistent with the Court's pronounced view that the defense is
valid if the "plaintiff bears at least substantially equal responsibility for the violations. "167 The Court then stated that the insider
commits a possibly wider range of violations than does his tippee. 168 Therefore, absent other actions by the tippee which could
increase his culpability and outweigh the insiders' violations, the
16 9
tippee cannot be of substantially equal fault with the tipper.
Once again the Court seems to be leaving open the availability of
the defense, a theme which is inconsistent with its prior expressed view that a tippee cannot be as culpable as his tipper
since his duty is derivative.
One of the possible readings of this disparity is that the
Court foresees situations in which the tippee's conduct outweighs the insiders' culpable conduct by a great margin.170 Such
a situation would be difficult to imagine. Any such scenario
would almost certainly leave the tipper without one of the elements necessary for a lOb-5 violation and, therefore, neither the
tipper nor the tippee would be liable since no duty would have
been breached by the insider. The decision thereby virtually renders moot the issue of the availability of the defense in the tippertippee context.
A correlative problem in Bateman Eichler is created by the
Court's inconsistent application of the facts. This is significant
because it permitted some of the law which the Court espoused
to produce seemingly incorrect results. One example of this difficulty is found in the Court's weighing of the relative culpabilities
of the parties. The complaint suggested rather strongly that1
7
much of the information that Lazzaro disseminated was true.'
Later in its opinion, the Court appeared to recognize the allegation that Lazzaro "masterminded this scheme to manipulate the
166 This interpretation is based on the theory that if a tippee's duty is derivative,
and that a tippee is therefore never as culpable as the insider/tipper, the Court's
substantially equal fault standard effectively precludes the application of the defense in future cases.
167 Bateman Eichler, 105 S. Ct. at 2629.
168 See supra note 157 and accompanying text for an explanation of these
violations.
169 Bateman Eichler, 105 S. Ct. at 2630-31.
170 This conclusion is based upon the court's judgment that "a person whose
liability is solely derivative can[not] be said to be as culpable." Id. at 2630. Since
the term "substantial equal responsibility" implies a degree of culpability somewhat less than equal, the Court's statement does not totally preclude a finding of
culpability on the part of the plaintiff, but does make it much more difficult.
171 Id. at 2629 n.21.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

168
market.'

72

[Vol. 17:148

However, by ultimately accepting the facts as de-

tailed in the complaint, the Court tacitly acknowledged that much
of the information that Lazzaro conveyed to the plaintiffs was
true and was, therefore, a factor reducing Lazzaro's culpability.
This consideration would have been important when the Court
weighed Lazzaro's culpability against that of the plaintiff-tippees.
The Court, however, never considered this factor when making
its analysis.
In addition, the Court failed to take other important facts
into consideration. For example, the plaintiffs stated that they
were told, and therefore believed, that gold exploration had been
performed in Surinam for more than 100 years.' 73 The complaint
also stated that, in reality, Surinam's highest gold production was
174
in 1908 and that it had declined steadily since that time.
These representations as to the length of time that gold had been
mined in Surinam were not inaccurate. The plaintiffs made no
claim that Lazzaro misrepresented to them the amount of gold
that was mined in Surinam. More importantly, the plaintiffs as
investors could easily have researched the history of Surinam's
gold production. 175 The significance of this point is that when
weighing the culpability of the parties, the plaintiff-tippees' reasonableness in relying on the information should certainly have
been a factor considered by the Court. The investors in the instant case could easily have investigated the validity of some of
Lazzaro's claims, but they failed to do so. As a result, the Court
should have increased the plaintiffs' culpability. Moreover, this
increased culpability would have been more significant had the
Court juxtaposed it with a proper reduction of Lazzaro's fault. 176

Another problem with the Bateman Eichler holding is the
Court's disregard of Bateman Eichler's argument concerning the
differences between the applicability of the in pari delicto defense
Id. at 2631.
See Joint Appendix, supra note 14, at 9.
174 Id.
175 See, e.g., NEWSPAPER ENTERPRISE ASSOCIATION, INC., THE WORLD ALMANAC &
BOOK OF FACTS 582 (1985).
176 By being forced to weigh relative culpabilities, the Court interposed state
common law fraud provisions into its analysis of the use of the in pari delicto defense
in rule lob-5 cases. This weighing of culpabilities, however, is in opposition to the
determination of liability under the rule. A party is liable under rule lob-5 if all of
the elements of a violation are present. See supra note 5 for text of rule. Nowhere in
rule lOb-5 is there a provision for weighing culpabilities. Accordingly, measurements of degrees of fault are irrelevant. Thus, the Bateman Eichler Court has interjected common law principles into the federal securities laws. Such action should
have included a complete and fair analysis of all factors impinging on culpability.
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in securities regulation cases as opposed to antitrust actions.
Bateman Eichler contended that there were crucial differences
between the federal antitrust laws and federal securities laws
which made the analogies to Perma Life improper. 177 According to
the defendants, the critical distinction between the two statutes
was that there is an express private right of action in the antitrust
statutes, while the private right of action under federal securities
laws has only been implied by the courts. 1 78 While the Court was
correct in stating that nothing in Perma Life implied that public
policy considerations should govern only when Congress has expressly provided for private remedies,' 7 9 the Court failed to address the true value of the defendants' argument. One of the
critical considerations that the Court made when considering the
public policy implications was whether allowing the defense was
80
consistent with the intent behind the federal securities laws.'
Since Congress expressly provided for a private right of action in
the antitrust laws, it is obvious that the legislature felt that such a
right was important for proper enforcement of the federal antitrust laws. By contrast, Congress's failure to expressly provide
for a private cause of action in securities laws cases may imply
that the legislature did not feel that such a right was as important
for enforcement of the securities laws. The Bateman Eichler Court
failed to address this distinction when drawing analogies between
the antitrust and securities laws except to state that whether the
right was expressed or implied was irrelevant.' 8 ' If, however, the
private right of action is the best way to promote the objectives of
the federal securities laws,' 82 the Court has failed to answer the
question why Congress did not expressly provide for such a
right. 183
Brief of Petitioner, supra note 160, at 31.
Id. at 32.
179 Bateman Eichler, 105 S. Ct. at 2628.
180 Id. at 2631.
181 Id. at 2628-29.
182 It is worth noting that Bateman Eichler appears to end a line of cases which has
restricted the private right of action under rule lOb-5. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (recognizing that parties must have fiduciary duty to
company before disclosure of information is violation); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (making scienter element of 1Ob-5 violation); TSC
Industries v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (defining materiality and requiring that disclosed information be material to constitute violation). Conversely, the
Bateman Eichler Court chose to encourage rather than restrict private rights of
action.
18,' The Court also failed to address why the development of the private right was
left to judicial interpretation.
177

178
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Another criticism of the Bateman Eichler holding concerns the
Court's affirmation of the policy of protecting the investing public which underlies the federal securities laws. A close reading of
the Court's opinion reveals that many of the points raised by the
Court under the veil of public policy are tenuous at best. One
problem arises from the Court's declaration that the best way to
stop information leaks is to cut off the source of the information."8 4 While it is true that if there is no one to release material
inside information to a tippee, the antifraud goals of the securities laws will be furthered; likewise, if no one takes the information and trades on it, the same goals will be met. It is for that
reason that both the "tipper" and "tippee" are held liable for
violations of rule lOb-5. The fact that the tippee's duty is derivative is irrelevant. Both the tippee and tipper are liable to defrauded investors when a lOb-5 violation is found.
It is also important to note that disallowing the defense will
not prevent insiders from distributing inside information. At the
very most, it will keep insiders from disseminating intentionally
false information. The value of protecting tippees in such situations is disputable since the tippee has also violated the securities
laws. 8' 5
Furthermore, the Bateman Eichler Court reasoned under the
public policy rubric that if it allowed the defense of in pari delicto,
then the SEC would lose a valuable tool used in uncovering lOb5 violations. 8 6 Congress, however, has not considered the private suit an important enough tool to express the right in legislation."' Nevertheless, in order to buttress its argument, the
Court noted that the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984188
184 Bateman Eichler, 105 S. Ct. at 2632.
185 For the sake of analogy, the Bateman Eichler Court's analysis may be compared
to its possible applications in other legal fields. For example, in the criminal law
context, it is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine a court mediating a dispute
between an illegal drug dealer and his buyer. This would be true even in cases in
which the dealer or buyer cheated the other. Likewise, in the area of contract law, a
court will allow the parties to an illegal contract to stand where it finds them. The
court will not mediate between wrongdoers. See also supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
186 Bateman Eichler, 105 S. Ct. at 2631.
187 In fact, the validity of the court's argument is rendered somewhat suspect by
the facts of the instant case. The investors brought suit against Bateman Eichler
and Lazzaro only after learning of an SEC investigation against Lazzaro for possible
fraud. SeeJoint Appendix, supra note 14, at 14. While this fact is not determinative,
it certainly diminishes the validity of the converse argument made by the SEC and
by the Court.
188 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 1985). See also supra note 157 for discussion
of Act's penalties.
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imposes civil and criminal penalties on the investor-tippee.1
The logic behind this argument is that the tippee should be allowed to recover from the insider, and that such a theory does
not give the tippee an "enforceable warranty" since he is still
subject to civil and criminal penalties under the Act.
This logic is clearly erroneous. If the penalties that the tippee is subject to under the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984
are less than his anticipated recovery from the suit, then the Act
serves as no deterrent to a tippee who traded on inside information and lost. If on the other hand, the penalties are equal to or
greater than his anticipated recovery, then no critically thinking
tippee would bring the suit since he would have nothing to gain
from it, and much to lose. These comments, therefore, defeat
the Court's and the SEC's goal of having lOb-5 violations
brought into the public view through tippee suits.
Finally, there is a problem with the Court's argument that
tippers are more likely than the normal investor to have the advice of counsel, and therefore are more likely to know what conduct is allowable. 190 The error with this logic is that rule lOb-5
does not require the trader to actually know that trading on inside information is a violation of the rule.' 9 ' Therefore, the "unknowing tippee"-one who does not know that trading on inside
information is a violation of the rule-is just as guilty as the
"knowing tipper" as long as the elements of a lOb-5 violation are
present. In addition, it is unlikely that a small investor would be
able to command the time and resources necessary to bring a
lOb-5 suit. Therefore, the plaintiffs in lOb-5 actions are usually
larger investors who are just as likely to have the benefit of counsel as is the insider.
It is suggested that the substantially equal fault standard espoused by the Bateman Eichler Court be clearly defined as meaning equal culpability. In cases in which the tippee is at least
equally responsible for his losses, he should be barred from recovering from his tipper. In spite of Dirks, it is still possible to
foresee a situation in which such equal culpability exists. For example, a sophisticated investor may approach a corporate officer
and initiate a scheme whereby the investor/tippee receives material nonpublic information. In this case, the tippee is as culpable
as the insider because the tippee originated the fraudulent plan.
1W) Bateman Eichler, 105 S. Ct. at 2633 n.31.
190 Id. at 2632.

I91 See supra note 5 for text of rule 1Ob-5.
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Some of the factors which courts should consider in weighing the relative culpabilities of the parties include the sophistication of the tippee/investor, the experience and knowledge of the
insider, which of the parties initiated the plan to release the information, and the prior dealings and relationships between the insider and the tippee. If weighing is unworkable because of the
inherent subjective nature of these factors, the defense should be
barred. This alternative is clearly more in line with the intent of
the securities laws to promote fairness in securities transactions.
This purpose is better served by a total ban on the in pan delicto
defense than by its haphazard and inconsistent application.
In conclusion, after considering the foregoing problems associated with the Bateman Eichler decision, it becomes clear that
the Court did not accomplish its objective. The Court, in attempting to resolve the issue of whether the defense of in panr
delicto is applicable in rule 1Ob-5 actions created more questions
than it answered. More importantly, the Court's failure to set
guidelines for future courts to follow in analyzing the applicability of the in pan delicto defense leaves unresolved the issue of the
appropriate use of the defense in rule lOb-5 actions.
Eric S. Mandelbaum

